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Executive Summary 
This report demonstrates that the transition to catch shares (sector management) under Amendment 16 to 
the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan caused unforeseen major shifts in the distribution of 
quota (and income) resulting in $21 million in direct economic losses and forgone yield of $19 million for 
the Massachusetts groundfish fishery. Scientifically valid alternative references points have been 
identified which can trigger increases in annual catch limits (ACLs) without sacrificing conservation. 
These increases are particularly helpful with regard to raising limits for choke species. Under optimal 
sector operating conditions, in which ACLs would be raised to the maximum amount that would be 
scientifically justified while still maintaining conservation goals,  we expect the increases to total 14,500 
mt more fish for the Northeast Multispecies fishery. 
 
Economic Emergency 
The National Oceanic and AtmosSKHULF$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vreview of landings and revenue data available 
for the first five months (May-September) of the 2010 fishing year shows that landings (and revenues) are 
comparable (or in some cases greater) to levels observed for this same period last year. While these data 
indicate potential economic health in the groundfishery as a whole, aggregate data masks unforeseen 
significant economic impacts that are happening at more local levels, partly through consolidation. The 
report finds that of 385 Massachusetts groundfish boats that have joined sectors, 56% have not yet been 
active in the fishery this year.  This compares to 46% inactive at this time last year.  The transition to 
catch shares has created gain for some fishing businesses, but low quota allocations represent an 
economic emergency for a significant portion of the fishing community. For example, a comparison of 
2010 Annual Catch Entitlements (ACE) to actual landings in recent years shows as much as two thirds of 
fishing permits were allocated 50%-60% less than their 2007-2009 average annual harvest. This reduction 
in allocation represents lost revenue of $21 million for this portion of permit holders.  
 
This information coupled with reports from Sector managers about many fewer vessels operating in the 
2010 fishery as compared to last year, demonstrates that a significant shift in the distribution of income 
has occurred. The total revenue for vessels that landed more than $300,000 during May-September (2010) 
DOPRVWGRXEOHVIURPPLOOLRQWRPLOOLRQZKLOHWKHQXPEHURIYHVVHOV LQVHFWRUV WKDWGLGQ¶W fish 
increased about 11%. In other words, 10% of the Massachusetts sector vessels landed about 64% of total 
revenue from May through September of 2010. The impacts of lost revenue are compounded by the 
increased operating costs that go along with sector management ± fees are assessed against sector 
landings to cover monitoring and administrative costs that can undermine the profitability of a trip.  
 
$FKDQJHLQWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRI³FDWFKHQWLWOHPHQW´FRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\EHPLWLJDWHGDQG the economics of 
catch shares improved if trading of quota between fishing operations (or sectors) were fluid; however, 
reports about sector activity indicate the market for catch trading and leasing is non-functioning. 
Additionally, many businesses are carrying past debt incurred in order to survive the 2007-2009 days-at-
sea (DAS) SURJUDPOHDYLQJILVKHUPHQZLWKRXWHTXLW\WRKHOSILQDQFH³QHZ´LQYHVWPHQWVQHHGHGWRFDUU\
added costs of the 2010 sector catch share program. The fact that so few participants are positioned to 
survive low ACLs, Amendment 16 allocations, and enter the quota-OHDVLQJPDUNHWDV³OHVVRUV´KDVFDXVHG
the quota-trading market to be heavy with potential ³EX\HUV´ZKRFDQQRWDIIRUGWROHDVHDWWKHSULFHVWKDW
SRWHQWLDO³VHOOHUV´QHHGWRPDNHEXVLQHVVVHQVH ³6HOOHUV´ZKRFDQDIIRUGWROHDVHDWDOHYHOORZHQRXJK
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for buying to make any business sense are almost absent from the market (Northeast Seafood Coalition, 
Vito Giacalone pers. comm.). 
 
The cumulative economic impacts ± which include high costs to operate within a sector, past debt 
incurred to survive the DAS program, lost harvest opportunities because of quota allocations, and added 
investment needed to continue in sector programs ± all contribute to decreased revenue for a significant 
portion of the industry, rapid consolidation of fishing businesses, rise in unemployment, and reduced 
infrastructure.  
 
Raising Catch Limits is Scientifically Justified 
We conclude that there are alternatives within the best available science for calculating and setting higher 
than current ACLs for 2010.  Of the three components that capture uncertainty in determining ACLs, all 
three used conservative methodology, sometimes “double counting” uncertainty.  Specifically, use of 
direct estimates of FMSY (overfishing definition) instead of lower proxy values (F40%MSP) for some stocks 
underestimates overfishing limits and lowers ACLs. Alternative assessments would allow increases in 
groundfish ACLs such as for Georges Bank yellowtail flounder. Smaller uncertainty buffers would 
accomplish the same increases. For some stocks, rebuilding objectives can be revised, thereby allowing 
increases in ACLs. In the context of the new management system, adding an uncertainty buffer to an 
overfishing limit that is based on an underestimate of FMSY or stock size is doubly precautious. Therefore, 
reconsideration and raising of ACLs is justifiable, based on direct FMSY and BMSY estimates, alternative 
stock assessments, or narrower uncertainty buffers. 
 
Combined adjustments provide ACL increases for all groundfish stocks with substantial increases for 
³FKRNH´ VSHFLHV VXFK DV *HRUJHV %DQN FRG DQG \HOORZWDLO IORXQGHU *XOI RI 0DLQH FRG DQG ZLQWHU
flounder, and southern New England winter flounder. ,QFUHDVHG$&/VIRU³FKRNHVWRFNV´ZLOODOORZWKH
groundfish fleet to reach far more of their allocations of other stocks thereby substantially increasing 
mixed-stock yield within the multispecies ACLs. This analysis, in which ACLs would be raised to the 
maximum amount that would be scientifically justified while still maintaining conservation goals reveals 
that increased ACLs will allow up to an an additional 14,500 mt (about 32 million pounds) of catch.  
 
Important effects of ACL increases were investigated using mixed-stock catch projections. Linear 
programmiQJWRRSWLPL]HFDWFKUHYHDOHGLQFUHDVHG$&/VUHGXFHGWKHQXPEHURI³FKRNHVSHFLHV´&DWFK
from all stocks could increase from either 6,800 mt to 9,800 mt or 36,600 mt to 51,100 mt depending on 
the success of trading ACE between groundfish sectors. 
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Introduction 
The Massachusetts Marine Fisheries Institute (MFI) was tasked with determining if scientific and 
economic justifications exist to support use of emergency authority by the Secretary of Commerce (SOC) 
to raise annual catch limits (ACLs) in the Northeast multispecies fishery. ACLs have been established 
through Framework Adjustment 44 (FW 44) to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan 
(FMP). Researchers from the University of Massachusetts School of Marine Science and Technology 
(SMAST) and Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries (DMF) teamed with stakeholders representing 
the Northeast Seafood Coalition to draft this report. The report provides an analysis and evaluation of the 
current economy and overall economic viability of the Massachusetts sector groundfish fleet resulting 
from the unforeseen consequences of unnecessarily low ACLs and market failure in trading under the 
new catch shares system, and what scientifically valid alternatives exist to increase ACLs. Methods of 
analysis and VRXUFHVRILQIRUPDWLRQLQFOXGHGLUHFWFRPSDULVRQVRI$PHQGPHQW¶VAnnual Catch 
Entitlement (ACE) to 2007-2009 Vessel Trip Report (VTR) information, optimization modeling to 
determine prospective harvest activity, and interviews with Massachusetts sector managers and 
representatives. 
    
Background 
Amendment 16, developed by the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) and 
implemented by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), began a catch share program known as 
³VHFWRUV´ in the Northeast multispecies fishery. Seventeen sectors were approved to operate during the 
2010 fishing year and over 95% of all ACLs for 20 groundfish stocks are sequestered within these 
sectors; the balance being assigned to a so-FDOOHG³FRPPRQSRRO´.1 
 
The Lack of a detailed analysis of impacts caused by sector management on individual vessels increases 
potential for unforeseen circumstances2 to jeopardize fishery performance and undermine goals of the 
Fishery Management Plan (FMP) and/or other related National policies.  
 
The complexity and imprecision of the new management system is partly a factor of the sequence of 
events during development of Amendment 16. The NEFMC adopted Amendment 16 well before (June 
22-25, 2009) it received stock assessment results from the Report of the 3rd Groundfish Assessment 
Review Meeting (September 3-4, 2009); the Scientific and Statistical Committee annual biological catch 
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV DQG WKH 3ODQ 'HYHORSPHQW 7HDP¶V SURSRVHG $&/V ZHUHQ¶W DGRSWHG DV SDUW RI
Framework 44, by the NEFMC until November 5th & November 17-19, 2009, respectively. In addition to 
not knowing the ACLs at the time of adopting Amendment 16, the implications of using 1996-2006 
landings history to calculate PSCs were unknown as were final participation levels in sectors and the 
common pool. The Public Hearing Document for Amendment 16 reads: ³(VWLPDWLQJWKHLPSDFWVWKDWZLOO
result from the proposed measures is difficult. The number of vessels that will join sectors will not be 
known until after passage of the Amendment, so there is uncertainty over what the actual impacts will 
                                                 
1 Individuals not enrolled in a sector become part of the common pool. 
2 Low Potential Sector Contributions (PSC) and consolidation impacts, the introduction of hard quota management 
to this Multispecies fishery, and the lack of transparent sector operations. 
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EH«´Too many decisions were made without benefit of detailed analyses.   This lack of understanding 
and identification of potential economic impacts in this context is in striking contrast to how other federal 
agencies tasked with environmental regulation proceed with major regulatory changes.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, completes extensive and robust economic 
analyses that predict economic impacts on different segments of the economy that may be impacted by 
new regulations.  
 
In the Amendment 16 final rule NMFS recognized that potential problems may have been caused by the 
allocation effects of the sector program as well as individual permit holders acquiring excessive control of 
fishing privileges. In a letter to the NEFMC, NMFS indicated that it would work with the NEFMC to 
UHVROYHSRWHQWLDO SUREOHPV ³«10)6ZLOOZRUNZLWK WKH&RXQFLO¶V ,QWHUVSHFLHV&RPPLWWHH WR FRQVLGHU
developing measures that would address tKHLVVXHRIVHFWRU$&(VDVWKH\UHODWHWRWKH)03¶VVRFLDODQG
HFRQRPLF REMHFWLYHV WKH &RXQFLO¶V VHFWRU PDQDJHPHQW SROLF\ WKH QDWLRQDO SROLF\ RQ FDWFK VKDUH
PDQDJHPHQWWKHDQGWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI1DWLRQDO6WDQGDUG«´ 
 
No one appreciates the socioeconomic impacts of sector management on the industry more than the 
industry itself. In January 2010 the Northeast Seafood Coalition commenting on 2010 sector operation 
plans and contracts said: ³«5HJUHWWDEO\WKHDOORZDEOHFDWFKHVKDYHEHHQJUHDWO\FRQVWUDLQHd by multiple 
applications of the precautionary principal in the setting of ACLs and MSRA rebuilding mandates. The 
accumulative impacts of these applications are stripping the fishery from any hope of avoiding colossal 
FRQVROLGDWLRQ«:HIHHOFRPSHOOHGWRH[press our profound concern for the eminent loss of hard working 
independent operators from our industry. NSC contends that these losses will be the direct result of the 
setting of ACLs. Unfortunately, most will believe it was the transition to sector management that caused 
WKHLUGHPLVH«´    
 
Recognizing the potential for sector management to be complex and imprecise, in 2009 the 
&RPPRQZHDOWK FRPPLVVLRQHG D UHSRUW WR SURYLGH DQ ³RXWVLGH´ FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH SROLF\ SURFHVV
regarding sectors. The authors of that June 2009 report3, Seth Macinko and William Whitmore, began by 
QRWLQJ WKDW ³management of New England groundfish fisheries appears to be in crisis and at a 
crossroads´  $PRQJ PDQ\ FRQFOXVLRQV DQG UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV WKHVH DXWKRUV QRWH WKH &RXQFLO
contradiction between desiring consolidation yet fearing its impacts on the existing structure of the 
industry. 
 
Economic Impacts 
Background 
Catch share management programs, when designed correctly4, may help to prevent overfishing, eliminate 
the race to fish, reduce overcapacity and bycatch, and improve economic efficiency. However, catch share 
                                                 
3 ³A New England Dilemma: Thinking Sectors Through´ 
4 Catch share systems as with any market based system require significant institutional support for information, 
transparency, secondary markets, and in the case of highly regulated resource use, monitoring the effects on 
participants. 
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programs may also result in the consolidation of fishing effort, reduce community involvement in local 
fishing, decrease access by small-scale fishermen to local fishery resources, create barriers to entry into 
the fishery by increasing the demand for capital to participate, and create competition among fishermen 
for access privileges.  
 
The National Oceanic and AtmosSKHULF$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vreview of landings and revenue data available 
for the first five months (May-September) of the 2010 fishing year shows that landings (and revenues) are 
comparable (or in some cases greater) to levels observed for this same period last year, prior to the 
implementation of catch shares. While these (aggregated) data show potential economic health in the 
groundfishery as a whole, aggregating the data masks significant economic impacts that are happening to 
individual fishermen or classes of permit holders at the local levels.  
 
Results 
The NMFS Vessel Trip Report (VTR) database provides a basic characterization of the Massachusetts 
groundfishing fleet. The fleet is defined here as sector vessels that have a principal port in Massachusetts 
and also have ACE in at least one groundfish stock. The fleet is comprised of 500 vessels and some 
accounting of their activity during 2010 is provided in Tables 1 and 2. More than 50% of sector boats are 
45 feet and smaller; 40% hail from Gloucester, 20% from New Bedford and a combined 25% from 
Chatham, Boston and Scituate.  
Table 1. Number of vessels in the Massachusetts groundfish fleet by length category. 
 Active Vessels (landing catch) A ll M A Sector 
Vessels Length May-Aug F Y2008 May-Aug F Y2009 May-Aug F Y2010 
<15' 0 1 0 115 
15-30' 1 3 1 48 
31-45' 88 94 78 152 
46'-60' 25 25 21 34 
61-75' 28 25 22 37 
76-90' 46 47 34 66 
90'+ 13 10 12 17 
? 3 3 1 31 
Total 204 208 169 500 
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Table 2. Number of vessels in the Massachusetts groundfish fleet by port. 
 Active Vessels (landing catch) A ll M A 
Sector 
Vessels 
Primary Port 
May-Aug 
F Y2008 
May-Aug 
F Y2009 
May-Aug 
F Y2010 
G L O U C EST E R 78 84 68 188 
N E W B E DF O RD 51 46 33 98 
C H A T H A M 18 21 18 69 
B OST O N 16 14 14 33 
SC I T U A T E 11 12 10 22 
H A R W I C H 4 4 5 16 
G R E E N H A RB O R 4 3 3 7 
N E W BUR YPO R T 3 3 3 6 
PR O VIN C E T O W N 3 2 3 5 
M A N C H EST E R 1 1 2 4 
PL Y M O U T H 4 4 2 4 
R O C K PO R T 4 5 2 7 
W O O DS H O L E 2 2 2 2 
F A IR H A V E N 0 1 1 2 
M A RB L E H E A D 0 1 1 4 
SA L ISBUR Y 1 1 1 2 
W ESTPO R T 1 1 1 1 
O T H E RS 3 3 0 30 
T O T A L 204 208 169 500 
 
The Standard Atlantic Fisheries Information System (SAFIS) was used to compare landings and revenue 
data for the first five months (May-September) of the fishing year for 2005-2010 (Tables 3 & 4, Figure 1). 
The SAFIS data show that total revenue from all species remained roughly constant from 2005 to 2009 at 
about $40 million for the first five months (May through September) of each fishing year (Table 4). 
Adjusting for inflation using the CPI-U, total revenue fell by about 15% over this period. For these same 
five months in 2010, total revenue increased by 21% over the average revenue for the first five months of 
the fishing year from 2005 through 2009 to $47 million for these 500 vessels, about $44 million after 
accounting for inflation.5 The distribution of income among the vessels, however, changed significantly in 
2010.  
 
Revenues are concentrated among a relatively small number of vessels. During the first five months of the 
2010 fishing year two-thirds of the Massachusetts groundfish fleet were inactive in the groundfishery 
while more than half of the fleet (253 vessels) had not fished at all, collecting zero fishing revenue from 
landings of any finfish. The number of inactive vessels in 2010 increased by 17 vessels over the average 
number of inactive for the first five months of the fishing year from 2005 through 2009 (Fig. 1).  
 
                                                 
5 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) program produces monthly data on changes in the prices paid by urban 
consumers for a representative basket of goods and services. There are separate indexes for two groups or 
populations of consumers: the CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) is the index most often reported by the 
national media. 
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Table 3. Number of permits within the Massachusetts groundfish fleet grouped by total May-Sep revenue 
from all species.  
Landings Value F Y2005 F Y2006 F Y2007 F Y2008 F Y2009 F Y2010 
$0 240 238 243 230 227 253 
$1-50K 78 75 77 72 66 69 
$51-100K 52 74 54 56 88 53 
$101-150K 39 30 41 50 47 27 
$151-200K 30 32 22 28 17 24 
$201-250K 21 18 22 25 22 19 
$251-300K 14 10 17 16 12 14 
$300K + 26 23 24 23 21 41 
Total w/ Landings 260 262 257 270 273 247 
(Source: SAFIS dealer reports) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F igure 1. Comparison of 2010 revenue distribution from all species (May through 
September) among active vessels in the Massachusetts groundfish fleet to the 2005-2009 
average. 
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Table 4. Sum of May-Sep revenue from landings value of all species by permit groups. 
Landings 
Value F Y2005 F Y2006 F Y2007 F Y2008 F Y2009 F Y2010 
$0  - - - - - - 
 $1-50K   $1,795,477  $1,656,624  $1,838,207   $  1,727,078   $  1,564,595   $  1,658,755  
 $51-100K  $3,768,407  $5,428,811  $4,014,619   $  4,149,512   $  6,321,359   $  3,890,524  
 $101-150K  $4,841,557  $3,779,581  $5,195,181   $  6,078,128   $  5,811,399   $  3,277,228  
 $151-200K  $5,273,539  $5,615,853  $3,784,722   $  4,802,112   $  2,960,948   $  4,145,155  
 $201-250K  $4,767,501  $3,975,342  $4,844,529   $  5,612,335   $  4,908,395   $  4,222,571  
 $251-300K  $3,840,786  $2,750,597  $4,670,644   $  4,395,020   $  3,314,354   $  3,827,156  
 $300K +  $14,984,380  $13,648,547  $14,339,143   $14,170,636   $14,185,705   $26,241,552  
 Total 
Value  
 
$39,271,648  
 
$36,855,355  
 
$38,687,045  $ 40,934,822 $39,066,756 $47,262,941 
(Source: SAFIS dealer reports) 
 
 
In addition to an increase in the number of inactive vessels, the number of vessels that earned more than 
$300,000 for this period in 2010 increased from 21 vessels to 41 vessels. These forty-one vessels account 
for roughly 55% of the total revenues. The remaining revenues are distributed among 206 vessels, the 
majority of which made less than $100,000. Stated in different terms, the share of total revenues earned 
by the top 10% of vessels increased from 57% of the total in 2009 to 64% of the total in 2010 (Figure 2). 
Conversely, the share of total revenues earned by the bottom 75% of vessels decreased from 20% in 2009 
to 12% in 2010 (Figure 3). 
 
 
F igure 2. Total revenues from all species earned by the top 10% of vessels in the Massachusetts 
groundfish fleet for 2005-2010  
(May ± September). 
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F igure 3. Total revenues from all species earned by the bottom 75% of vessels in the 
Massachusetts groundfish fleet for 2005-2010 (May ± September). 
 
Furthermore, distribution of allocation resulted in direct economic losses to two-thirds of permit holders 
totaling $21 million (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Comparison FY2010 ACE and FY2009 VTR groundfish landings for Massachusetts groundfish fleet. 
 Number of  Permits   
ST O C K 
F Y10-A C E 
> F Y09-
V T R 
F Y10-A C E 
< F Y09-
V T R 
No 
F Y09 
V T R 
Lbs 
Sum of 
Losers 
Deficits in 
Pounds 
Value of 
Losers 
Deficits 
Georges Bank Cod 64 84 352 1,425,057 $     2,078,629 
Gulf of M aine Cod 38 131 331 5,249,153 $     7,656,564 
Georges Bank Haddock 114 11 375 279,129 $        308,567 
Gulf of M aine Haddock 95 55 350 332,255 $        367,297 
Georges Bank Yellowtail F lounder 24 59 417 773,723 $     1,013,660 
SN E/M A Yellowtail F lounder 7 15 478 14,959 $         19,598 
C C/G O M Yellowtail F lounder 54 106 340 496,743 $        650,787 
Plaice 124 66 310 763,663 $     1,037,276 
Witch F lounder 76 112 312 705,564 $     1,411,003 
Georges Bank Winter F lounder 31 49 420 1,028,636 $     1,699,616 
Gulf of M aine Winter F lounder 54 77 369 213,753 $        353,184 
Redfish 106 39 355 791,708 $        375,192 
White Hake 84 61 355 400,613 $        493,835 
Pollock 73 142 285 4,602,257 $     3,604,083 
T O T A L    17,077,212 $   21,069,290 
 
 
Interviews with some sector managers and administrators of the Northeast Seafood Coalition (NSC) were 
conducted to determine 2010 fisheries performance under the sector program. The NSC offered a 
perspective provided by industry leader Vito Giacalone. Mr. Giacalone has been very involved in sector 
management HVSHFLDOO\ LQ0DVVDFKXVHWWV E\ YLUWXH RI KLV RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V 16& LQLWLDWLYH WR DQWLFLSDWH
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hard-quota management for groundfish by avoiding common pool derby fishing and encouraging 
fishermen to form and join sectors.  
 
Twelve sectors have NSC affiliation and assistance in one form or another. 7KH\DUHWHUPHG³1RUWKHDVW
Fishery Sector II-;,,,´ZLWKDSSUR[LPDWHO\DFWLYHYHVVHOV. These vessels have been allocated about 
69% of Gulf of Maine cod ACE, for example.  
 
The relatively narrow distribution of ACE that resulted from the allocation, based only on catch history 
(1996-2006), has caused a substantial number of fishermen who were active in the fishery in 2009 to 
become insolvent. This is due to the fact that their 2010 allocations are well below their 2009 catches and 
to varying degrees, below a level that would allow break-even fishing revenues. 
 
While this general result was arguably foreseeable and the Amendment 16 analysis recognized this 
mathematical reality, the fact that these permit holders would have little chance to acquire additional 
quota sufficient to meet a break-even point was definitely unforeseen. The NEFMC approved the 
management system and allocation baselines without knowledge of the ACLs. For example, the Gulf of 
Maine Cod ACL was estimated to be approximately 11,000 mt during the Amendment process. The final 
ACL figure was approximately 8,000 mt which resulted in individual allocations far below those 
anticipated by fishing stakeholders. The real-world implications of sector management were 
unforeseeable until after implementation of final ACLs in Framework 44. Little could be known about 
how the fishery would react/adjust to this radical change in management approach, without the context of 
Framework 44. 
 
For the intended economic efficiencies and profitability of catch shares to be realized as forecasted in 
Amendment 16, a high level of quota movement would need to occur from those who were allocated 
below a break-even point to those who were close to or above the break-even point. For this to happen 
there would have to be an extraordinary level of liquidity within the fishery. A large number of previously 
active participants would have to be capable of freezing or liquidating their fishing operations and leasing 
their quota to someone else. What was not adequately studied (if at all) was the capability of the fishery to 
do this.  The result is a non-functioning market for trading and leasing quota. 
 
The reality is that most fishermen active in the fishery in 2009 were small businessmen who had endured 
a severe period of consolidation and recapitalization which ensued following Amendment 13 days-at-sea 
cuts and days-at-sea leasing. Those who survived and still actively fished in 2009 were those who fully 
expected to continue as active participants in the fishery. This reality was immensely underestimated 
GXULQJWKH$PHQGPHQWSURFHVVDQGLVKHDYLO\FRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHXQIRUHVHHQUHVXOWRI³WUDSSHG´TXRWD
Previously (2009) active fishermen are paralyzed by the lack of quota available for lease because it is not 
easy to liquidate a vessel and all the associated financial obligations related to a small fishing business. It 
is not financially feasible for these small businessmen to simply lease their quota to cover expenses let 
alone earn a living. 
 
The fact that so few participants are positioned to survive low ACLs and Amendment 16 allocations and 
to enter the quota-leasing market as ³leasers´ has caused the quota-trading market to be heavy with 
potential ³EX\HUV´who cannot afford to lease at the prices that potential ³sellers´ need to make business 
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sense. ³Sellers´ who can afford to lease at a level low enough for buying to make any business sense are 
almost absent from the market. The market crafted by government regulation has failed to develop as 
predicted by Amendment 16 to the economic detriment of the industry. This overlooked, unforeseen, 
outcome is contributing to a leasing market that is inadequate for most of these recently crippled fishing 
operations to secure enough additional quota to meet break-even margins. 
 
Simply put, too many fishermen who were very active in the 2009 fishing year cannot afford to buy and 
they cannot afford to sell. The fact that so many fishermen have been placed in this paralyzed state is not 
only an emergency, but is clearly a result not adequately considered or foreseen by managers and the 
agency.  
 
It is misleading to look at gross revenues as a measure of success or failure in these first six months of 
sector management. What must be understood is that net revenues are now drastically reduced as the costs 
of renting fish have become the highest percentage of fishing expenses of any expense realized in the 
past. Only those who have secured enough of the initial allocation are able to rationalize the high lease 
costs by cost averaging, yet they are working at unsafe margins due to a market that is financially 
incapable of leasing for less. Such market conditions may reduce industry participation to levels too low 
to maintain current dimensions of fishing communities and infrastructure.   
 
Increasing the ACLs will move the break-even line down the quota-disabled list resulting in fewer 
business failures. This will result in further leveraging of any additional quota made available through 
increasing the ACLs.  
 
Best Available Science Supporting Adjustment of ACLs 
 
Background 
National Standard 1 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act6 (MSA) 
UHTXLUHV WKDW ³conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a 
continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry´86'2&
1976). The 2007 reauthorization of the MSA introduced the requirement for annual catch limits and 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\PHDVXUHV³(DFK&RXQFLOVKDOO«HVWDEOish a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits 
in the plan (including a multiyear plan), implementing regulations, or annual specifications, at a level 
such that overfishing does not occur in the fishery, including measures to ensure accountability´ 8S 
'2&2YHUILVKLQJ LVGHILQHG LQ WKH0DJQXVRQ$FWDV WKH³rate or level of fishing mortality that 
jeopardizes the capacity of a fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis´
(i.e., FMSY).  
 
                                                 
6 As amended through January 12, 2007 [P.L. 109-479]. 
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National Standard Guidelines suggest: a) that ACLs be based on an estimate of the magnitude of catch 
that will result in overfishing and associated uncertainty in the estimate, and b) ACL cannot exceed 
Acceptable Biological Catch (Figure 4). 7   
 
F igure 4. Relationship between the overfishing limit, acceptable biological catch and the 
annual catch limit (from National Standard Guidelines, NOAA 2009) 
 
In practice, Acceptable Biological Catch is derived from three components:  
1. the overfishing reference point,  
2. the projected estimate of stock size, and  
3. a buffer to account for scientific uncertainty. 
 
Additionally, Acceptable Biological Catch needs to allow rebuilding objectives to be achieved. Fishing 
mortality needs to be reduced to less than FMSY WRDOORZµRYHUILVKHG¶VWRFNVWRUHEXLOG 
 
Existing Information to Support Increased ACLs 
Scientifically valid alternatives may be available for each component of Acceptable Biological Catch to 
allow increases in ACLs: 
 
Direct estimates of F MSY would allow several increases in groundfish A C Ls. In 2002, FMSY was 
HVWLPDWHGIRUDOO1HZ(QJODQGJURXQGILVKVWRFNVXVLQJVHYHUDOPRGHOLQJDSSURDFKHVDQGWKHµEHVWPRGHO¶
was determined using conventional model selection methods (NEFSC 2002). Although a direct estimate 
of FMSY was determined for some stocks, a proxy for FMSY (F%MSP, the fishing mortality associated with a 
percentage of maximum spawning potential) was used for most stocks. All FMSY estimates were replaced 
with F%MSP at the 3rd Groundfish Assessment Review Meeting (NEFSC 2008). Considering that FMSY is 
                                                 
7 National Standard Guidelines (NOAA 2009) do not have the force and effect of law 
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the legal definition of overfishing, the overfishing limits of Gulf of Maine cod, Georges Bank cod, 
Georges Bank yellowtail, southern New England yellowtail, Gulf of Maine winter flounder, southern 
New England winter flounder, and white hake are underestimated, and associated ACLs can be justifiably 
increased.  
 
A lternative assessments would allow further increases in groundfish A C Ls. Several alternative stock 
assessment approaches were developed for the 3rd Groundfish Assessment Review Meeting (NEFSC 
2008). Several models had substantial uncertainty manifest by retrospective inconsistency. The Review 
Panel chose some models that either adjusted estimates for retrospective inconsistency or reduced 
retrospective inconsistency by assuming that survey eIILFLHQFLHVFKDQJHG LQ WKHPLGV µ%DVHFDVH¶
models (with no retrospective adjustment or revised survey assumptions) estimated greater stock sizes. 
)RUH[DPSOHLIµEDVHFDVH¶VWRFNDVVHVVPHQWVZHUHXVHGWRGHWHUPLQHVWRFNVWDWXVRI*XOIRI0DLQHZLQWer 
IORXQGHU WKH VWRFNZRXOG QRW EH FRQVLGHUHG RYHUILVKHG$OWKRXJK µEDVH FDVH¶PRGHOV KDYH GLDJQRVWLF
problems, they are the simplest analyses of all available data, and they were the method used to assess 
principal groundfish stocks for decades. By comparison, split survey models imply substantial increases 
in survey efficiencies (some greater than 100%); and adjusted models account for a potential bias that is 
not understood and may not persist. Retrospective adjustments are justified by some persistent 
retrospective patterns that caused management errors (e.g., Georges Bank yellowtail flounder). 
Conversely, retrospective patterns of other stocks have ceased or reversed direction (e.g., southern New 
England yellowtail and Cape Cod yellowtail), in which case a retrospective adjustment would have been 
inappropriate. Other alternative estimates of stock size are also available for some stocks that would 
justify increases in ACLs. For example, the alternative assessment of Georges Bank yellowtail that 
includes large survey tows provides an estimate of stock size that is nearly twice as large as the split 
survey series model (Legault et al. 2010). Similarly, swept-area survey estimates of the Gulf of Maine 
winter stock provide a method for deriving greater catch limits (Groundfish PDT 2010).  
 
Smaller buffers would allow further increases in groundfish A C Ls. Acceptable Biological Catch for 
most New England groundfish stocks is based on 75%FMSY, because uncertainty could not be reliably 
estimated by groundfish stock assessments, providing a 25% buffer between the overfishing limit and the 
Acceptable Biological Catch to account for scientific uncertainty. A recent 75%FMSY projection analysis 
found that probability of overfishing was less than 10% (pollock, NEFSC 2010, Groundfish PDT 2010), 
which is less than the acceptable range of risk determined by several regional management Councils 
(Witherell 2010). Similar analyses for other groundfish stocks should be investigated to determine the 
probability of overfishing at 75%FMSY. Smaller buffers may have more acceptable levels of risk, and 
Acceptable Biological Catches based on 75%FMSY can be increased up to 33%, and still conform to the 
maximum sustainable yield definition in the Magnuson Act. Although uncertainty buffers are 
recommended by NS1 guidelines, NMFS has supported minimal buffers in other regions (e.g., <1% 
buffer for Alaskan crabs supported by the Northwest Regional Office; NPFMC 2010). 
 
Revised rebuilding objectives would allow increases in groundfish A C Ls. Acceptable Biological 
Catch of some stocks is based on rebuilding objectives. As illustrated for Georges Bank yellowtail 
flounder, Acceptable Biological Catch can increase if rebuilding objectives are revised (Groundfish PDT 
2010). Rebuilding plans can be revised by increasing the rebuilding period, using a direct estimate of 
BMSY rather than a proxy, or reducing the expected probability of achieving objectives to 50%. The best 
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estimates of BMSY (i.e., those associated with the best estimates of FMSY) are less than the rebuilding target 
for Georges Bank yellowtail, southern New England yellowtail, southern New England winter flounder, 
DQGZKLWH KDNH$GGLWLRQDOO\ LI µEDVH FDVH¶ VWRFN DVVHVVPHQWVZHUH XVHG WR GHWHUPLQH VWRFN VWDWXV RI
Georges Bank yellowtail and southern New England winter flounder, Acceptable Biological Catch 
associated with rebuilding would be much greater. Determining the magnitude of ACL increases allowed 
by revised stock size or rebuilding targets would require revised projection analysis. 
 
An important consideration in selecting the most appropriate scientific information to derive ACLs is the 
chronological development of scientific information in the context of revised mandates and guidelines. 
The 2002 re-evaluation of overfishing definitions and the 2008 stock assessments were completed before 
National Standard guidelines were published, and the system for incorporating scientific uncertainty 
could not be considered by the 2002 working group or the 2008 review panel. The new ACL system 
requires that a) the estimate of catch associated with overfishing should be risk-neutral (i.e., neither risk-
averse nor risk-SURQHDQGEVFLHQWLILFXQFHUWDLQW\DQGILVKHU\PDQDJHUV¶FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIULVNVKRXOGEH
accounted for in the Acceptable Biological Catch (NOAA 2009).  
 
Some analytical choices associated with FMSY and stock assessment models may be risk-averse rather than 
risk-neutral (e.g., choice of F%MSP as a FMSY proxy, retrospective adjustments, split survey series, 
exclusion of large survey tows). In the context of the new management system, adding an uncertainty 
buffer to an overfishing limit that is based on an underestimate of FMSY or stock size is doubly 
precautious. Therefore, reconsideration of ACLs may be justifiable, based on direct FMSY and BMSY 
estimates, alternative stock assessments, or narrower uncertainty buffers.  
 
Results 
Although the potential increases from each component of Acceptable Biological Catch should be 
considered separately, the mathematical relationship between the overfishing definition, stock size 
estimate, and uncertainty buffer in deriving Acceptable Biological Catch implies that multiple sources of 
increase are multiplicative. Combined adjustments justify increases in ACLs for all New England 
groundfish stocks, ZLWKVXEVWDQWLDOLQFUHDVHVIRUµFKRNHVWRFNV¶VXFKDV*HRUJHV%DQN\HOORZWDLOIORXQGHU
Georges Bank cod, Gulf of Maine winter flounder, and southern New England winter flounder (Table 7). 
,QFUHDVHG$&/V IRU µFKRNH VWRFNV¶ DUH H[SHFWHG WR DOORZ WKH IOHHW to achieve their allocation of other 
stocks, thereby substantially increasing the mixed-stock yield within the multispecies ACLs. Preliminary 
analysis of mixed-stock catches suggests that the increased ACLs would allow 14,500 tons more than the 
current ACLs. 
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Table 7. Alternative ACLs for New England groundfish stocks raised to the maximum amount that would 
be scientifically justified while still maintaining conservation goals.  
 
 FMSY  values  and  FMSY  proxies  are  from  NEFSC  (2002)  to  compare  estimates  with  the  same  input  data.  
 %  difference  in  overfishing  definition  is  based  on  the  difference  in  exploitation  rates  calculated  as  (F/Z)(1-­‐e-­‐z),  where  Z  is  
the  total  mortality  and  M  is  natural  mortality  rate.  
 Stock  size  estimates  are  from  Table  4  of  NEFSC  2008.  
 Increased  Frebuild  allowed  by  greater  stock  size  or  lower  BMSY  ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ;ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚĂƐ͚͍͛Ϳ͘  
 Pollock  estimates  are  from  NEFSC  2010.  
 The  Gulf  of  Maine  winter  flounder  ABC  is  from  Groundfish  PDT  (2010).  
Table 7 provides examples of how overfishing limits, Acceptable Biological Catch and ACLs can be 
increased using reference point estimates and stock size estimates from existing scientific documents. 
Other alternative estimates of FMSY or stock size are also possible, and may allow further increases in 
ACLs. Similar investigations of scientific information available to increase ACLs can be applied to other 
fishery management plans in New England. For example, the recent determination that winter and little 
skates are rebuilt suggests that the 20,000-lb trip limit allowed recovery of the two target skate species, 
and the current 500-lb trip limit can be relaxed to increase landings and decrease skate discards. The 
current ACLs pose substantial economic costs and losses to fishing communities (NEFMC 2009, NOAA 
2010), and these losses can be mitigated by increasing ACLs within the limits of sustainability and sound 
scientific information that exists today. 
 
Inconsistency with National Catch Share Policy 
 
NOAA released its National Catch Share Policy on November 4th, 2010.  Given that Amendment 16 was 
approved prior to NOAA finalizing the National Catch Share Policy, we note that implementation of 
Amendment 16, especially with regards to the transition to a new regulatory regime, would have 
benefited from this type of guidance during the creation of the catch share program.   
 D ILVKLQJ FRPPXQLW\ LV GHILQHG DV RQH ZKLFK LV ³VXEVWDQWLDOO\ GHSHQGHQW RQ or (emphasis 
added) substantially engaged in the harvest or processing of fishery resources to meet social 
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and economic needs, and includes fishing vessel owners, operators, and crew and United 
6WDWHV SURFHVVRUV WKDW DUH EDVHG LQ VXFK FRPPXQLW\´ 0DJQXVRQ-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act as Amended through January 12, 2007), and 
 (2)  the NOAA National Catch Share Policy (2010) indicates: 
(a) NOAA will work in partnership with Councils, other federal agencies, and coastal 
states (emphasis added) to promote sustainable fishing communities, resource access, and 
co-management principOHV« 
E «&RXQFLOV VKRXOG GHYHORS SROLFLHV µWR DVVXUH FRQWLQXDWLRQ RI ZRUNLQJ ILVKHU\
ZDWHUIURQWVILVKHU\LQIUDVWUXFWXUHGLYHUVHILVKLQJIOHHWV«¶DQG 
(c) NOAA will collaborate with state and local governments to help communities address 
problems associated with long-term fishery and community sustainability. 
 
Consequently, we submit that a marked inconsistency exists between the National Catch Share Policy and 
implementation of $PHQGPHQW¶V VHFWRU ILVKHU\ 7KH)03KDV LPSOHPHQWHGXQQHFHVVDULO\ ORZDnd 
precautionary ACLs for the multispecies fishery without sufficient and adequate analyses or consideration 
of those ACLs on sustaining Northeast fishing communities, especially in the Commonwealth.    
 
5HFRJQL]LQJ  $PHQGPHQW ¶V ODFN RI VRFLRHFRQRPLF analyses and troubling trends in catch and 
ILVKHUPHQ¶VEHKDYLRUGXULQJWKHILUVWVL[PRQWKVRIWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGWKH&DWFK
6KDUH 3ROLF\¶V LQWHQW IRU WKHUH WR EH D SDUWQHUVKLS DQG FROODERUDWLRQ ZLWK FRDVWDO VWDWHV to assure 
continuation of working fishery waterfronts, infrastructure, and diverse fishing fleets, higher ACLs within 
bounds of conservation limits would respond to those trends and industry behavior with the expressed 
purpose of minimizing adverse socioeconomic impacts on the &RPPRQZHDOWK¶VILVKLQJFRPPXQLWLHVDQG
maximizing prospects for success of Amendment 16 sector management.   Increasing catch limits would 
EXLOGD³VWURQJIRXQGDWLRQIRUZLGHVSUHDGFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIFDWFKVKDUHV´DQGZRXOGEHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH
National Catch Share Policy. 
 
Summary and Recommendations 
Federal management of the groundfish fishery now relies on the sector framework to mitigate economic 
impacts of low ACLs. Yet, this report shows the transition to catch shares (sector management) under 
Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan caused shifts in the distribution 
of quota (or income) worth $21 million in direct economic losses and forgone yield worth $19 million for 
the Massachusetts groundfish fishery. Raising federal catch limits may be the only solution to the 
ILVKHU\¶VFULVLVVLQFHPDQ\SDUWLFLSDQWVFDQ¶WDIIRUGWRSXUFKDVHPRUHTXRWDDQGGRQRWZDQWWKHILVKHU\WR
opt out of the current sector management system. 
 
Scientifically valid alternative references points have been identified which trigger significant increases in 
annual catch limits (ACLs). As a mitigating factor, these increases are particularly helpful with regard to 
raising limits for choke species.  Under optimal sector operating conditions, in which ACLs would be 
raised to the maximum amount that would be scientifically justified while still maintaining conservation 
goals,  we expect the increases to total 14,500 mt more fish for the Northeast Multispecies fishery. 
.  
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 We recommend Secretarial action to immediately increase ACLs consistent with guidelines 
provided in this report.  
 
 Alternative scientific decisions would support increases in ACLs for all New England groundfish 
VWRFNVZLWKVXEVWDQWLDO LQFUHDVHV IRU µFKRNHVWRFNV¶ VXFKDV*HRUJHV%DQN\HOORZWDil flounder, 
Georges Bank cod, Gulf of Maine winter flounder, and southern New England winter flounder 
 
Increasing ACLs will provide significant economic benefits by being risk averse for the fishing industry, 
enhancing the ability of sectors to mitigate economic impact, and increasing mixed yield as a portion of 
FDWFK HQWLWOHPHQWV E\ UHGXFLQJ WKH LQIOXHQFH RI ³FKRNH´ VSHFLHV $OO RI WKHVH RXWFRPHV SURPRWH WKH
effective continuation of the sector program in New England, while minimizing actual adverse socio-
economic impacts on fishing communities and fishing businesses that are attributable to this catch share 
program. Swift action will mitigate the effects of fishing effort consolidation and help ensure fishing 
communities maintain stable access to local fishery resources.  
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Glossary 
Acceptable Biological Catch (AB C): DOHYHORIDVWRFNRUVWRFNFRPSOH[¶VDQQXDOFDWFKWKDWDFFRXQWVIRU
the scientific uncertainty in the estimate of OFL and should be specified based on the ABC control rule. 
 
Accountability Measures (A Ms): management controls that prevent ACLs or sector ACLs from being 
exceeded (in-season AMs), where possible, and correct or mitigate overages if the occur. 
 
Annual Catch Limit (A C L): the level of annual catch of a stock or stock complex that serves as the basis 
for invoking accountability measures. 
 
Annual Catch Target (A C T): an amount of annual catch of a stock or stock complex that is the 
PDQDJHPHQWWDUJHWRIWKHILVKHU\$VWRFNRUVWRFNFRPSOH[¶V$&7VKRXOGXVXDOO\EHOHVVWKDQLWV$&/
and rHVXOWVIURPWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH$&7FRQWUROUXOH,IVHFWRU$&/¶VKDYHEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGHDFKRQH
should have a sector ACT. 
 
Optimum Yield (O Y): The term "optimum", with respect to the yield from a fishery, means the amount 
of fish which -  
(A) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food 
production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine 
ecosystems; 
(B) is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as 
reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor; and 
(C) in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with 
producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery. 
 
" Overfishing "  DQG³2YHUILVKHG: a rate or level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the capacity of a 
fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis. 
 
Overfishing L imit (O F L): the annual amount of catch that corresponds to the estimate of MFMT applied 
WRDVWRFNRUVWRFNFRPSOH[¶VDEXQGDQFHDQGLVH[SUHVVHGLQWHUPVRIQXPEHUVRIZHLJKWRIILVK 
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